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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal involves a challenge to the constitutionality 
of section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 
S 106(a). That section purports to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity in federal court. The defendant-appellee, 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Public 
Welfare ("DPW"), argued before the bankruptcy court that 
section 106(a) was not enacted pursuant to a valid exercise 
of congressional power. Therefore, DPW asserted that the 
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution 
bars Debtor-appellant Sacred Heart Hospital of 
Norristown's ("Sacred Heart") lawsuit against DPW. The 
bankruptcy court denied DPW's claim of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. It also entered an order on the 
merits granting declaratory judgment for Sacred Heart. The 
district court reversed the bankruptcy court's order dealing 
with Eleventh Amendment immunity and thereafter vacated 
the order of the bankruptcy court concerning the merits of 
the dispute. We will affirm the district court. 
 
I. 
 
Sacred Heart, an acute care community hospital in 
Norristown, Pennsylvania, began providing medical 
treatment to patients under Pennsylvania's Medical 
Assistance program ("the Program"), 55 Pa. Code S 1101.11 
et seq., in 1967. By May of 1994, however,financial 
difficulties forced Sacred Heart to cease operations and lay 
off substantially all of its several hundred employees. 
Shortly thereafter, Sacred Heart filed a voluntary petition 
for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code. 
 
During the course of Sacred Heart's Chapter 11 
proceedings, the Commonwealth asserted various claims 
against the Debtor. The Commonwealth's Department of 
Labor and Industry ("DLI") asserted claims against the 
Debtor for amounts claimed to be owed to the 
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Commonwealth under the Commonwealth's Unemployment 
Compensation and Workers' Compensation statutes; the 
Commonwealth's Department of Revenue ("DOR") asserted 
claims against the Debtor for sales and use taxes; and DPW 
asserted a claim against the Debtor arising under a lease.1 
 
Earlier in the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor 
submitted invoices to DPW to obtain payment for some of 
the medical treatments it provided to patients under the 
Program. The Commonwealth's Office of Inspector General 
("OIG") returned the invoices to the Debtor, however, 
because they were incorrectly completed. The Debtor 
resubmitted them to OIG in January of 1996, and 
submitted additional invoices to DPW in May of 1996. DPW 
denied all of the Debtor's claims because the Debtor failed 
to comply with 55 Pa. Code S 1101.68. This statute requires 
claims to be submitted to DPW within 180 days after the 
treatment is rendered. 
 
The Debtor subsequently filed in the bankruptcy court 
the instant adversary proceeding against DPW, demanding 
judgment against DPW "in the amount to which it is 
entitled under the Medical Assistance program." Adv. 
Compl. at 5. The Debtor did not request a declaratory 
judgment, nor did it request any prospective injunctive 
relief against any Commonwealth officials. 
 
DPW filed motions to dismiss based principally on the 
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Sacred Heart responded by claiming that no 
Commonwealth agency was entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in these proceedings because the 
DLI and DOR claims in the bankruptcy proceedings 
constituted a waiver of the Commonwealth's sovereign  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although DPW filed a proof of claim against the Debtor in these 
proceedings, it is undisputed that this claim was misdocketed. The lease 
in question was between DPW and the Sacred Heart General Hospital 
("SHGH"), which also had a matter pending in the Bankruptcy Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Once DPW recognized that its claim 
against SHGH was unrelated to the Debtor, it agreed not to pursue any 
claim against the Debtor and not to oppose the Debtor's objection to the 
claim. Sacred Heart has never argued that DPW waived its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity because of this inadvertent filing. 
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immunity.2 Sacred Heart did not argue that the Eleventh 
Amendment did not apply or that DPW had waived its 
immunity under 11 U.S.C. S 106(c). 
 
The bankruptcy court denied DPW's motions. It held that 
the Eleventh Amendment was not implicated because: (1) 
the adversary complaint sought not monetary relief but 
only a declaration that section 108(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Code affected state billing rules to require that otherwise 
untimely invoices be accepted as timely; and (2) the 
Commonwealth waived its sovereign immunity as to all 
claims relating to Sacred Heart's bankruptcy proceedings 
when DLI filed its proof of claim for unreimbursed 
unemployment benefits.3 The bankruptcy court 
subsequently issued a final order, stating that "[u]pon 
advice of the Debtor's counsel . . . the Debtor would 
presently be satisfied with an Order declaring 11 U.S.C. 
S 108(a) applies here." App. at A52.4 The bankruptcy court 
ordered that DPW accept as timely all billings that were not 
untimely under state rules as of the filing of Sacred Heart's 
bankruptcy. The Commonwealth appealed both orders to 
the district court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. While it is unclear whether Sacred Heart's waiver argument before the 
bankruptcy court was based on 11 U.S.C. S 106(b) or some undefined 
general waiver principle, we need not be concerned with this ambiguity 
(or the constitutional issues concerning either theory) because Sacred 
Heart has failed to pursue these arguments in this appeal. 
 
3. DPW filed an immediate appeal of this order under the collateral order 
exception to the final judgment rule. Although the bankruptcy court 
refused to grant a stay pending appeal, the district court subsequently 
granted the stay. 
 
4. Section 108(a) provides as follows: 
 
       (a) If applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a non- 
       bankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period within which 
       the debtor may commence an action, and such period has not 
       expired before the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee 
may 
       commence such action only before the later of-- 
 
       (1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such 
       period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or 
 
       (2) two years after the order for relief. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 108(a) (1993). 
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The district court by order entered on January 21, 1997, 
reversed the bankruptcy court. Specifically, the district 
court held that 11 U.S.C. S 106(a), which purports to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity, violates the Eleventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution in light of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).5 The district 
court also determined that, because there was no 
contention that Sacred Heart's claims against DPW arose 
out of the same transaction or occurrence as either DLI's or 
DOR's claims against Sacred Heart, DPW did not waive its 
immunity pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 106(b). In addition, 
because Sacred Heart never argued before the bankruptcy 
court that its claims were raised to offset DLI's or DOR's 
claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 106(c), the district court 
found this issue waived. Finally, the district court held that 
the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over the adversary 
proceeding after DPW appealed the August 7, 1996, order 
of the bankruptcy court, which was a collateral order 
dealing with the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. It also 
vacated the August 15, 1996, order of the bankruptcy court 
which dealt with the merits of the adversary proceedings. 
This appeal followed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code, entitled "Waiver of sovereign 
immunity," provides, in pertinent part: 
 
        (a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign 
       immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set 
       forth in this section with respect to the following: 
 
        (1) Sections . . . 106 [and] 108 . . . of this title. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        (b) A governmental unit that has filed a proof of claim in the 
case 
       is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity with respect to a 
       claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate 
       and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrence out of 
       which the claim of such governmental unit arose. 
 
        (c) Notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity by a 
       governmental unit, there shall be offset against a claim or 
interest 
       of a governmental unit any claim against such governmental unit 
       that is property of the estate. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 106 (1994). 
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Sacred Heart essentially raises three arguments on 
appeal. First, it contends that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not limit bankruptcy court jurisdiction because 
bankruptcy courts do not exercise the judicial power of the 
United States under Article III. Second, it asserts that the 
Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, S 8, cl. 4, vests 
Congress with the power to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity from suit in federal court. Third, it maintains 
that even if the Bankruptcy Clause itself does not authorize 
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity, Congress' 
abrogation of sovereign immunity in section 106(a) should 
be sustained as a valid exercise of its enforcement power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.6 
 
II. 
 
"Because in bankruptcy cases the district court sits as an 
appellate court, our review of the district court's decision is 
plenary." Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit 
Union, 851 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Universal 
Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 101-02 
(3d Cir. 1981)). We review the findings of fact of the 
bankruptcy court only for clear error. Id. (citing In re 
Morrissey, 717 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 1983)). Findings of 
fact by a trial court are clearly erroneous when, after 
reviewing the evidence, the appellate court is "left with a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 
U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (1985) (quotation 
marks omitted). We exercise plenary review over legal 
questions. In re Fegeley, 118 F.3d 979, 982 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(citing In re Siciliano, 13 F.3d 748, 750 (3d Cir. 1994)). It is 
error for a district court, when acting in the capacity of a 
court of appeals, to make its own factual findings. Universal 
Minerals, 669 F.2d at 104. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. DPW also contends that because DLI and DORfiled proofs of claim in 
these proceedings, Sacred Heart may bring a declaratory judgment 
action against DPW pursuant to section 106's "offset" provision, 11 
U.S.C. S 106(c). However, we need not address this argument and, thus, 
the constitutionality of 11 U.S.C. S 106(c), because Sacred Heart failed 
to 
raise this issue below and, therefore, for purposes of this appeal, has 
waived it. 
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The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1334(a) and 28 U.S.C. S 157(a). The district court's 
appellate jurisdiction was based upon 28 U.S.C. S 158(a) 
and the collateral order exception to the final judgment 
rule. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & 
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 142-43, 113 S. Ct. 684, 687 
(1993). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 158(d). 
 
III. 
 
The Eleventh Amendment provides: 
 
       The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
       construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
       commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
       States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
       Subjects of any Foreign State. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although the Amendment expressly 
prohibits only suits against States by citizens of other 
States, the Supreme Court has long held that the Eleventh 
Amendment also bars suits against the State by its own 
citizens, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S. 
Ct. 1347, 1355 (1974) (collecting cases), and may bar suits 
invoking the federal question jurisdiction of Article III 
courts. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, ___ U.S. 
___, ___, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (1997) (citing Seminole 
Tribe, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S. Ct. at 1114). This immunity 
is based on a two-part presupposition: (1) "each State is a 
sovereign entity in our federal system[,]" Seminole Tribe, ___ 
U.S. at ___, 116 S. Ct. at 1122; and (2) "[i]t is inherent in 
the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of 
an individual without its consent." Id. at ___, 116 S. Ct. at 
1122 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, is not 
absolute. When, as here, a plaintiff seeks recovery only 
from the state, and not from its officials, there are two ways 
to divest a state of its Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity and hale the state into federal court. First, a 
state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity and 
consent to suit in federal court. See Atascadero State Hosp. 
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3145 
(1985). Second, Congress can abrogate a state's Eleventh 
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Amendment immunity, but only if two requirements are 
met: Congress must unequivocally express an intent to 
abrogate state immunity, and the legislative action must be 
"pursuant to a valid exercise of power . . . ." Green v. 
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S. Ct. 423, 425-26 (1985) 
(citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 
U.S. 89, 98, 104 S. Ct. 900, 906 (1984)). 
 
"Congress' intent to abrogate the States' immunity from 
suit must be obvious from `a clear legislative statement.' " 
Seminole Tribe, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S. Ct. at 1123 (quoting 
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786, 
111 S. Ct. 2578, 2584 (1991)). "A general authorization for 
suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory 
language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment." 
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246, 105 S. Ct. at 3149. Rather, 
abrogation will be effected only when the intent to abrogate 
is "stated by the most express language or by such 
overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no 
room for any other reasonable construction." Id. at 239-40, 
105 S. Ct. at 3146 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
If congressional intent to abrogate is found, a federal 
court must next determine whether Congress, in enacting 
the specific legislation, was acting pursuant to a valid 
exercise of power. Prior to Seminole Tribe, the Supreme 
Court had recognized two sources of authority through 
which Congress could validly abrogate state sovereign 
immunity: section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976), 
and the Interstate Commerce Clause. Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989). In Seminole 
Tribe, however, the Court overruled Union Gas and held 
that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power 
under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent 
the constitutional limitations placed upon federal 
jurisdiction." ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32. "Thus, 
since Seminole Tribe section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has been the sole basis for Congress to 
abrogate the states' immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment."7 College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. As the Fitzpatrick Court explained, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, expanded 
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Postsecondary Education Expense Bd., ___ F.3d ___, ___, 
1997 WL 749514, at *4 (3d Cir. Dec. 5, 1997). 
 
In light of the foregoing, we must determine, first, 
whether Congress expressly abrogated the states' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity when enacting the current version of 
section 106(a),8 and, second, whether the Act in question 
was passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting 
Congress the power to abrogate. 
 
There can be no doubt that Congress unequivocally 
expressed its intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity under the Bankruptcy Code. See 
Matter of Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241, 243 (5th Cir. 1997); In 
re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 
1140, 1145 (4th Cir. 1997). Section 106(a) explicitly states 
that, "[n]otwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, 
sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit 
to the extent set forth in this section . . . ." The only 
question before us, therefore, is whether Congress acted 
pursuant to a valid exercise of its power. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
federal power at the expense of state autonomy and thereby 
fundamentally altered the pre-existing balance between state and federal 
power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment. 427 U.S. at 
453-56, 96 S. Ct. at 2670-71. The Court reaffirmed this view of section 
5 in Seminole Tribe. ___ U.S. at #6D 6D6D#, 116 S. Ct. at 1128. 
 
8. Pursuant to section 113 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994), former section 106(c) was 
amended and recodified as current section 106(a). The Amendment was 
intended to overrule United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 
112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992) and Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income 
Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989), "two Supreme Court 
cases that have held the States and Federal Government are not deemed 
to have waived their sovereign immunity by virtue of enacting section 
106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code." 140 Cong. Rec. H10766 (daily ed. Oct. 
4, 1994) (Section-By-Section Description). The amendment was also 
intended "to clarify[ ] the original intent of Congress in enacting 
Section 
106 of the Bankruptcy Code with regard to sovereign immunity." See 
Matter of Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(quotation marks omitted), judgment vacated sub nom. Ohio Agr. 
Commodity Depositors Fund v. Mahern, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 1411 
(1996). 
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Sacred Heart contends that Seminole Tribe merely held 
that Congress could not abrogate sovereign immunity 
pursuant to the Indian and Interstate Commerce Clauses 
and did not address Congress' other Article I powers. 
Sacred Heart also argues that the Bankruptcy Clause is 
distinguishable from other Article I clauses because it 
contains an affirmative requirement of uniformity. In 
addition, Sacred Heart asserts that we should uphold 
section 106(a) as a valid exercise of Congress' power under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.9  We find each of 
these arguments unpersuasive. 
 
The Seminole Tribe Court held that Congress may not 
abrogate state sovereign immunity by legislation passed 
pursuant to its Article I powers. ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S. Ct. 
at 1131-32. The Court stated: 
 
       Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete 
       law-making authority over a particular area, the 
       Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional 
       authorization of suits by private parties against 
       unconsenting States. The Eleventh Amendment 
       restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article 
       I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional 
       limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). The Court thereby overruled Union 
Gas, its only prior case finding congressional authority to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to an Article I 
power, and "restored the balance of power between 
Congress and the Judiciary anticipated by the Framers in 
Article I and Article III of the Constitution . . . ." Close v. 
New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1997). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. While Sacred Heart also contends that the Eleventh Amendment is not 
even implicated in this matter because bankruptcy courts do not 
exercise the judicial power of the United States under Article III, this 
argument cannot withstand the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement 
in Seminole Tribe that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial 
power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the 
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction." ___ U.S. at 
___, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32. See also In re Grewe, 4 F.3d 299, 304 (4th 
Cir. 1993) ("[W]hile functionally there may appear to be a separate 
bankruptcy court, for jurisdictional purposes there is only one court, 
i.e., 
the district court." (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
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Moreover, there is simply no principled basis to 
distinguish the Bankruptcy Clause from other Article I 
clauses. See Matter of Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 244; In re 
Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1145-46; see also 
Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 111, 109 S. Ct. at 2828 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) ("I see no reason to treat Congress' power under 
the Bankruptcy Clause any differently [than the Commerce 
Clause], for both constitutional provisions give Congress 
plenary power over national economic activity." (citation 
omitted)). Nor does the uniformity requirement in the 
Bankruptcy Clause change this analysis. "The 
Constitutional requirement of uniformity is a requirement 
of geographic uniformity" and nothing more. Vanston 
Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 172, 
67 S. Ct. 237, 244 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
Because Eleventh Amendment immunity applies uniformly 
to all states and to all parties in a bankruptcy proceeding, 
the uniformity requirement is not frustrated, and Sacred 
Heart's argument must fail. As such, we hold that the 
Bankruptcy Clause is not a valid source of abrogation 
power. 
 
Equally unavailing is Sacred Heart's assertion that 
Congress enacted section 106(a) pursuant to section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides that "Congress shall have the power 
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, S 5. "Correctly viewed, S 5 
is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress 
to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what 
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Katzenback v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 
641, 651, 86 S. Ct. 1717, 1723-24 (1966). Congress' power, 
however, "extends only to enforc[ing] the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." City of Boerne v. Flores, ___ U.S. 
___, ___, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997) (quotation marks 
omitted). "Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, 
non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is 
not supported by our case law." Id. at ___, 117 S. Ct. at 
2167-68. 
 
While Congress need not "recite the words `section 5' or 
`Fourteenth Amendment' or `equal protection' " when 
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enacting laws pursuant to this power, E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 
460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1064 n.18 (1983) 
(citation omitted), "if Congress does not explicitly identify 
the source of its power as the Fourteenth Amendment, 
there must be something about the act connecting it to 
recognized Fourteenth Amendment aims." Wilson-Jones v. 
Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210 (6th Cir. 1996), modified on 
other grounds, 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam);10 
see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 
U.S. 1, 16, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1539 (1981) (respect for state 
sovereignty requires that courts "should not quickly 
attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under its 
authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment"). Here, 
there is simply no evidence suggesting that section 106(a) 
was enacted pursuant to any constitutional provision other 
than Congress' Bankruptcy Clause power. See Matter of 
Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 245; In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 
F.3d at 1146; In re Kish, 212 B.R. 808, 815 (D.N.J. 1997); 
In re C.J. Rogers, Inc., 212 B.R. 265, 272-73 (E.D. Mich. 
1997). On the contrary, 
 
       the conclusion seems logically inescapable that in 
       passing the 1994 Act Congress exercised the same 
       specifically enumerated Article I bankruptcy power that 
       it has traditionally relied on in enacting prior 
       incarnations of the bankruptcy law dating back to 
       1860--68 years before the passage of the Fourteenth 
       Amendment. We will not presume that Congress 
       intended to enact a law under a general Fourteenth 
       Amendment power to remedy an unspecified violation 
       of rights when a specific, substantive Article I power 
       clearly enabled the law. 
 
In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1146 (citation 
omitted). Sacred Heart's argument must fail. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Although the Wilson-Jones court indicated that the only cases it 
"could locate where legislation was upheld under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's enforcement clause concerned discrimination by state 
actors on the basis of race or gender[,]" 99 F.3d at 210, this court 
recently considered whether the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act of 
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992), was a valid 
mechanism to enforce the Due Process Clause. See College Savings 
Bank, ___ F.3d at ___-___, 1997 WL 749514, at *5-9. 
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Finally, we also reject Sacred Heart's contention that 
bankruptcy constitutes a "privilege or immunity" under 
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby enabling 
Congress to utilize section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. As we 
observed in Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 264 (3d 
Cir. 1990), the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment "has remained essentially 
moribund" since the Supreme Court's decision in The 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), and 
the Supreme Court has subsequently relied almost 
exclusively on the Due Process Clause as the source of 
unenumerated rights.11 Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
expressly held that there is no constitutional right to a 
bankruptcy discharge, see United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 
434, 446-47, 93 S. Ct. 631, 638-39 (1973), and we can 
conceive of no reason to resuscitate this section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by finding that bankruptcy is a 
privilege of national citizenship. See Matter of Fernandez, 
123 F.3d at 245 ("[T]here is no indication that Congress 
passed the 1994 Act to remedy any incipient breaches or 
even some unarticulated, general violation of the rights 
specified in S 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment." (citation 
omitted)); see also In re Kish, 212 B.R. at 817; In re NVR, 
L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 842 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997). 
 
Having concluded that Congress may not abrogate state 
sovereign immunity pursuant to any of its Article I powers, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. "The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from abridging the 
privileges and immunities that flow from national citizenship." In re 
Storer, 58 F.3d 1125, 1128 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, S 1). The most prominent rights of national citizenship were 
catalogued in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14 (1908), 
and include the right to inform federal officials of violations of federal 
law, In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 15 S. Ct. 959 (1895), the right to be 
free from violence while in the lawful custody of a United States marshal, 
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 12 S. Ct. 617 (1892), the right to 
enter the public lands, United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 5 S. Ct. 
35 (1884), the right to vote in national elections, The Ku-Klux Cases, 110 
U.S. 651, 4 S. Ct. 152 (1884), the right to petition Congress for redress 
of grievances, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542 (1875), 
and the right to pass freely from state to state, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). 
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and that there is no evidence that Congress enacted section 
106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, we hold that section 106(a) is 
unconstitutional to the extent that it purports to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity in federal court. The January 21, 
1997, order of the district court will be affirmed in all 
respects. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I agree with the majority holding rejecting the 
Bankruptcy Clause as a source of abrogation power post- 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 
1114 (1996), and consequently declaring 11 U.S.C. S 106(a) 
unconstitutional. I write separately, however, to express my 
concern about the breadth of the language used by the 
majority in reaching this holding. 
 
The Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe, rejected both the 
Indian Commerce Clause and, by overruling Pennsylvania 
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273 (1989), the 
Interstate Commerce Clause as sources of abrogation 
power. ___ U.S. at __, 116 S.Ct. at 1127, 1131. The majority 
in the instant case, concludes that "there is simply no 
principled basis to distinguish the Bankruptcy Clause from 
other Article I clauses." Majority Op. at 12. I would not go 
so far as to discuss the merits of Article I powers other than 
the ones at issue in Seminole Tribe and the instant case: 
the Interstate Commerce Clauses, and the Bankruptcy 
Clause, respectively. I would hold that there is simply no 
principled basis to distinguish the Bankruptcy Clause from 
the Interstate Commerce Clause. In both words and scope, 
the Bankruptcy Clause is identical to the Indian Commerce 
Clause. Both clauses read as follows: "The Congress shall 
have Power [t]o . . . ." Furthermore, nothing in the history 
or text of the Bankruptcy Clause indicates any more an 
"alter[ation of the] pre-existing balance between state and 
federal power," Seminole Tribe, #6D6D 6D# U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 
1128, than the Indian Commerce Clause. 
 
In short, I would not foreclose the possibility that in the 
post-Seminole Tribe era, there exist any  Article I powers 
sufficiently [powerful/unique/similar to the Fourteenth 
Amendment in effect as] to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity. See, e.g., Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 
F.3d 609, 616 (1st Cir. 1996) (reaffirming that Congress, 
acting pursuant to its War Powers, see U.S. Const. art. I, 
S 8, abrogated state sovereign immunity to damages actions 
brought under the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act, 38 
U.S.C. S 2021 et seq.). As the First Circuit reasoned, it is 
not clear that the Court's holding in Seminole Tribe was so 
broad as to strike down all sources of abrogation power in 
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Article I. 90 F.3d at 616. I would deal with potential 
sources of abrogation power in Article I, as they arise on a 
case-by-case basis. 
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